Whose Metaethical Minimalism? by Birondo, Noell
37
:KRVH0HWDHWKLFDO0LQLPDOLVP"
Noell Birondo
Wichita State University
1. In the published version of his John Locke lectures, originally delivered 
in Oxford in 2009, T. M. Scanlon defends a position he calls ‘Reasons 
Fundamentalism’ (2014).1  Scanlon’s position maintains that the normative 
notion of a reason – a consideration that ‘counts in favor’ of an action or 
an attitude – is an irreducibly normative notion.  He thinks that reasons are 
fundamental in the sense of being irreducible.  Scanlon characterizes his 
position as follows:
I will maintain that truths about reasons are fundamental 
in the sense that truths about reasons are not reducible to or 
LGHQWL¿DEOHZLWKQRQQRUPDWLYHWUXWKVVXFKDVWUXWKVDERXWWKH
natural world of physical objects, causes and effects, nor can 
they be explained in terms of notions of rationality or rational 
agency that are not themselves claims about reasons. (2014, p. 
2)
Having rejected those ‘naturalistic’ possibilities, Scanlon also says that in 
order to maintain that moral propositions are sometimes straightforwardly 
true we need not appeal to any kind of “special metaphysical reality” 
(2014, p. 52).  Thus it might seem that Scanlon is defending a very 
unappealing metaethical position, since the resources that he rejects 
here – both ‘naturalism’ and the type of ‘non-naturalism’ that invokes a 
‘special metaphysical reality’ – might seem to exhaust the possibilities 
for normative ‘truth makers.’  Scanlon’s position might seem to be that 
although moral propositions can be straightforwardly true, there is nothing 
that makes them true.  According to this metaethical ‘minimalist’ position, 
there are true moral propositions but “there are no moral properties – not 
on earth, in Plato’s Heaven, or anywhere else.”2  However, I believe that 
a closer look at Scanlon’s discussion reveals that Scanlon does not in 
fact hold any such view.  I will come back to that below.  Here I want to 
emphasize that the issue is not just about understanding Scanlon, although 
his position does often seem to be misunderstood.3  The actual position 
GHIHQGHGE\6FDQORQPLJKWPRUH VLJQL¿FDQWO\SRLQW WKHZD\ WRZDUGD
satisfying non-reductive position in metaethics, one that embodies the 
ontological modesty that disavows any appeal to a ‘special metaphysical 
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reality’ in Scanlon’s sense.4
2.  In a recent paper Raff Donelson (2018) aims to make problems for a 
SRVLWLRQWKDWKHFDOOVµPHWDHWKLFDOPLQLPDOLVP¶±DSRVLWLRQWKDWKH¿QGVLQ
the recent work of Scanlon and also in the work of Richard Rorty, Hilary 
Putnam, and Ronald Dworkin (2018, p. 125).  According to Donelson, 
PHWDHWKLFDO PLQLPDOLVP LV WKH YLHZ WKDW ³¿UVWRUGHU PRUDO MXGJPHQWV
can be true but nothing makes them true” (2018, p. 125).  On this view 
everyday moral claims such as “murder is wrong” can be true even though 
there are no moral ‘truth makers’ – e.g., no metaphysical “objects” or “real 
normative things” (Donelson, 2018, p. 125) – that make it true that murder 
is immoral.  One of Donelson’s criticisms of this position is therefore that, 
according to it, true moral propositions seem to be “totally unmoored from 
the world” (2018, p. 129).
Donelson’s central criticism of metaethical minimalism is that such 
a position fails to deliver any theoretical gains over its metaethical 
ULYDOV  SS   6SHFL¿FDOO\ PHWDHWKLFDO PLQLPDOLVP IDLOV
to make any theoretical gains over the type of metaethical ‘error theory’ 
or ‘eliminativism’ defended by J. L. Mackie and others up until the 
present day.  This error-theoretic position denies that there are any moral 
propositions that are non-trivially true precisely because it denies that 
there are any normative ‘objects’ or ‘properties’ that could make such 
propositions true.  Donelson thinks that minimalists try to have it both 
ways.  He says: “According to the minimalist, ‘Murder is wrong’ is true, 
so, yes, it is fact [sic] that murder is wrong.  However, the minimalist will 
not assent to the existence of some wrong-making property that licenses 
one to say ‘Murder is wrong.’” (2018, pp. 125-126).  Donelson makes 
the point more emphatically in a further passage (already quoted in part 
above):
As I see it, minimalism has no theoretical advantages relative 
to an error theoretic eliminativist strategy.  Or, to put the point 
another way, I can see no reason to insist that moral propositions 
are true, if one agrees with the error theorist that there are no 
moral properties – not on earth, in Plato’s Heaven, or anywhere 
else. (2018, p. 127)
This understanding of metaethical minimalism lies at the heart of 
Donelson’s misgivings about there being any semantic, epistemological, 
or practical gains for minimalism over its rivals.  But it seems to me that 
any plausible metaethical position in this vicinity, including Scanlon’s 
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own non-reductive position, will not in fact agree with the error-theoretic 
claim that there are no moral, or more generally normative, properties.
3. In articulating his own position, Scanlon draws upon the work of Rudolph 
Carnap, William W. Tait, and others in order to enlist the idea that there 
are different ‘domains’ of intellectual inquiry with their own standards of 
LQTXLU\VRIRULQVWDQFHWKHVFLHQWL¿FGRPDLQWKHPDWKHPDWLFDOGRPDLQ
and the normative domain (Scanlon, 2014, Lecture 2).  Scanlon says that 
these different domains have their own ‘internal’ criteria for assessing the 
truth of propositions within the relevant domain, including claims about 
ZKDW WKHUH LV  7KH QRUPDWLYH GRPDLQ LV XQOLNH WKH VFLHQWL¿F GRPDLQ
Scanlon says, since the normative domain “is not a realm of objects” 
(2014, p. 19).
But even so Scanlon says explicitly that: “Things in the natural world, 
such as persons and their actions, have normative properties, and most 
normative claims are about such things” (2014, p. 19).  Now it is not 
exactly clear what the word ‘things’ refers to in the last part of this claim, 
what the ‘things’ are that normative claims are said to be about; but the 
most likely possibility is that these things are a combination of natural and 
normative items.  The position seems to be that “most normative claims” 
are about persons and the actions they perform, items in the natural world 
that have various normative properties, but that such claims fall partly 
within the ‘normative domain’ – i.e., “the domain of judgments about 
reasons” (2014, p. 34).  This passage indicates that Scanlon does not think 
that there are no normative properties.  His position seems to be, as he 
says, that things in the natural world have normative properties, and that 
most normative claims are about such things.5
Scanlon makes a similar point when he compares his own view to 
the views of Crispin Wright and John Skorupski, two philosophers whose 
views Scanlon takes to be similar to his own.  Regarding mathematical and 
other non-spatiotemporal ‘objects,’ Scanlon says:
My view about the criteria of existence for numbers and other 
non-spatio-temporal objects is very close to Wright’s.  But 
saying that these things are ‘furnishings of the world’ seems 
to me misleading, and unnecessarily to invite a response like 
Mackie’s [according to which one would be appealing to a 
‘special metaphysical reality’].  On the other hand, while I am in 
broad agreement with John Skorpuski’s [sic] view, particularly 
with his view that normative propositions need not have ‘truth 
makers’ that enter into causal relations, I would not say that 
this makes normative relations irreal. (2014, p. 24, n. 9 [my 
emphasis in the longer phrase, and my brackets])
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Scanlon’s claim in the phrase I have emphasized – that non-spatiotemporal 
‘truth makers’ need not enter into any causal relations – obviously falls 
well short of the extreme ‘minimalist’ idea, that there are no normative 
‘truth makers’ at all.  Moreover, in this passage Scanlon explicitly denies 
that normative relations are in any way ‘irreal’ – let alone non-existent. 
Such passages sharpen the question of whose position ‘metaethical 
minimalism’ is supposed to be, the position that Donelson’s paper is so 
concerned to criticize.6
What is ultimately more important here is the tendency manifested in 
this overall line of criticism: insisting that something can be a ‘truth maker’ 
for a normative proposition only if it is either (1) an object, property, or 
VWDWH RI DIIDLUV µZLWKLQ¶ WKH QDWXUDOVFLHQWL¿F GRPDLQ RI LQTXLU\ RU 
something that has the ‘special metaphysical reality’ of something like 
‘Plato’s Heaven.’  But a more plausible moderate intermediary position 
also remains possible here.  Such a position maintains that there are moral, 
and more generally normative, propositions that are non-trivially true. 
6XFKSURSRVLWLRQVDUHQRWPDGHWUXHE\LWHPVµZLWKLQ¶WKHQDWXUDOVFLHQWL¿F
domain of inquiry, nor by anything having ‘special metaphysical reality.’ 
Now it may be, as Scanlon sometimes suggests, that there is nothing 
especially interesting or informative to be said about the ontology of the 
normative properties that underwrite true moral propositions, ‘over and 
above’ our invoking such properties in normative reasoning.  But, then 
again, maybe there is something interesting and informative to say here 
after all: consider, for instance, the excellent recent discussions by William 
J. FitzPatrick (2014; 2008).7
In these brief remarks I have not myself aimed to defend, nor even to 
make plausible, this type of a moderate intermediate position, but only to 
emphasize the very possibility of such a position, which can sometimes 
be overlooked altogether.  What should be clear by now is that this 
type of moderate intermediate position, including Scanlon’s ‘Reasons 
Fundamentalism,’ is not a version of metaethical ‘minimalism’ since it 
does not involve the extreme ‘anti-Parmenidean’ idea that there can be true 
moral propositions and that nothing makes them true.
Notes
 1 These remarks were originally presented as a commentary on what is now 
Donelson (2018) at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society 
at Baylor University in 2017 and I would like to thank the conference organizers 
for the invitation to comment on the paper. 
 2 That is one characterization of the ‘minimalist’ position that Donelson 
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¿QGVXQKHOSIXOIRUDGYDQFLQJVHPDQWLFHSLVWHPRORJLFDODQGSUDFWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQV
in metaethics (Donelson, 2018, p. 127); I quote the full passage from which this 
characterization comes in §2 in the main text. 
 3 See Birondo (2017) on the apparent misunderstanding displayed in Dreier 
(2015) of Scanlon’s repudiation of ‘special metaphysical reality.’  The objection 
to ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ from so-called ‘counter-reasons’ (Enoch, 2011, pp. 
122-127) also seems to involve a misunderstanding of Scanlon’s position, given 
Scanlon’s sensible response to that objection (Scanlon, 2014, pp. 29-30).  Here 
it is important to mention that Scanlon revised the text of his Locke Lectures 
between their occasion (2009) and their publication (2014), and that Enoch rightly 
acknowledges Scanlon’s intention to do so (Enoch, 2011, p. 122, n. 74). 
 4 What sense is that?  It seems to me that any ‘standard of existence’ that 
is genuinely ‘domain-independent,’ as Scanlon characterizes that latter notion 
(2014, Lecture 2), would thereby invoke (even in the case of physical objects) 
the ‘special metaphysical reality’ that Scanlon repudiates in the normative case. 
On the one hand, Scanlon says that if we respond to the ‘anti-Platonist’ worries of 
someone like J. L. Mackie by “denying that numbers, say, are part of the natural 
world, while still insisting that they are part of ‘the world’ we invite questions 
about what this shadowy ‘world’ is [i.e., something having domain-independent 
metaphysical reality] to which numbers and perhaps other non-spatial entities all 
belong” (2014, p. 24; citing McDowell, 1985).  But Scanlon makes the same point 
about physical objects: “For physical objects to exist is for them to have spatio-
temporal location, to have various physical properties, and to interact causally 
with other objects.  The relevant idea of ‘thickness’ [of existence] is thus domain-
VSHFL¿F  ,W LVQRWSURYLGHGE\ VRPH IXUWKHU LGHDRIPHWDSK\VLFDO UHDOLW\ >1%@
over and above the properties just mentioned” (2014, p. 28).  Scanlon says that 
his position regarding ontology here agrees with the position of his long-time 
colleague Hilary Putnam (Scanlon, 2014, p. 25, n. 11; citing Putnam, 2004). 
 5 7KH TXDOL¿FDWLRQ WKDW ³PRVW´ QRUPDWLYH FODLPV DUH DERXW VXFK WKLQJV
UHÀHFWV6FDQORQ¶VYLHZWKDWPRVWQRUPDWLYHFODLPVDUHµPL[HG¶UDWKHUWKDQµSXUH¶
Scanlon says: “Most of the claims we commonly think of as normative are not 
pure normative claims, but mixed normative claims.  They involve pure normative 
claims but also make or presuppose claims about natural facts” (2014, p. 37). 
Scanlon says that a ‘pure’ normative claim is “a claim that R(p, x, c, a) holds (or 
does not hold)” understood as involving the four-place relation R’s “essentially 
normative content,” viz. that “whether p obtains or not, should p hold then it is a 
reason for someone in c to do a” (Scanlon, 2014, pp. 36-37).  Much of Scanlon’s 
discussion in Lecture 2, especially in §5, is devoted to explicating this four-
place relation.  I take Scanlon’s disavowal of (italicized) normative “properties” 
SQ WR UHÀHFWKLV UHSXGLDWLRQRISURSHUWLHVKDYLQJ WKH µVSHFLDO
metaphysical reality’ that he refers to only a few sentences earlier. 
 6 On Hilary Putnam, see n. 4 above; Ronald Dworkin’s position hardly 
points in a different direction from the positions of Putnam and Scanlon, at least 
for anything Donelson says about Dworkin’s position (2018, p. 125); and Richard 
Rorty rejects altogether (since at least Rorty, 1979) any role for propositional 
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